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The recent recession has seen something of resurgence in the debate over military 
Keynesianism. Recent commentators who should no better have claimed that it would 
make sense to stimulate the US economy through increases in military spending, as 
though this has not been a commonly contested view over the last 40 years. A large 
literature has debated the economic effects of military spending and while it has 
reached no consensus, there is also little support for any belief that military spending 
is a good way of stimulating the economy. This paper makes a contribution to the 
debate by assessing the theoretical perspectives and the empirical approaches used. It 
then undertakes an analysis of the US using a number of approaches and the results 
suggest that the simple Military Keynesian arguments still lack empirical support.  
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Introduction 
 
With the recent recession and there has been something of a resurgence of military 
Keynesianism, the belief that military expenditure represents a useful if the only form 
of state spending to use to stimulate the economy. In a Wall Street Journal article in 
2008 Martin Feldstein suggested that any Department of Defense budget cuts were 
misguided. He suggested that the US government recognised the need for increasing 
government spending to offset the decline in consumer demand in the economy and 
argued that a rise in military spending would be the best way to provide this stimulus.  
While showing a complete ignorance of, or disregard for, the research that has been 
undertaken on the economic effects of military spending, this view does seem to have 
other supporters/proponents, particularly in the US. It is understandable that 
commentators might look to the post Second World War period and the stimulus to 
unprecedented growth rates provided by state spending, including massive military 
spending as the Cold War developed. Yet, today’s world and economy are rather 
different, with the Cold War having altered the relation between the military and the 
economy drastically and the post Cold War changing it even further. These changes 
are argued to have made the military sector a burden on the economy, necessary for 
security but no longer of value in stimulating economic growth. Certainly, reviews of 
the empirical literature have tended to find a predominance of results showing 
negative or insignificant effects of military spending (Dunne and Uye, 2010), but 
many of these do not use specifically Keynesian models and vary in the length of time 
series and coverage.  
 
Given this renewed interest in Military Keynesianism, this paper takes the opportunity 
to revisit the issues involved. It considers briefly what the real arguments are in the 
debate over the economic functions of military spending and where they come from 
then provides a review of the empirical evidence and then provides an econometric 
analysis for the US. The next section briefly surveys the theoretical basis for 
Keynesian analyses of the impact of military spending on the economy. This is 
followed by a section in which the adequacy of the Keynesian narratives in explaining 
the patterns of military spending over time relative to strategic explanations are 
evaluated. The following section provides an econometric analysis of the Keynesian 
arguments, using cointegrating VAR models, using a long data set from 1929-2009. 




Military expenditure and the economy 
 
As a starting point it is useful to consider where military Keynesian ideas come from. 
A basic Keynesian perspective would see military spending as simply one component 
of government spending, with effective demand/multiplier effects. In this way 
military spending can be good for an economy, getting it out of recession and helping 
plan expansions in effective demand.  This can be on the basis of an IS-LM updated 
to account for changes in monetary theory and recently used by Atesoglu (2004), 
Pieroni et al (2008) and Smith and Tuttle. This type of study tends to have output 
determined by military spending, civil spending and interest rates and to find a 
positive impact of military spending for the US, though the second paper is more 
nuanced and the last study actually finds a negative effect. In addition, Keynesian   3
models that introduce an aggregate production function have tended to find negative 
effects of military spending (Dunne and Uye, 2009) and using large structural models 
has also tended to show the existence of a ‘peace dividend’ as the benefit of reducing 
military spending and reallocating it has been termed (Gleditsch et al, 1996). It is also 
generally accepted, however, that war would have a negative impact upon the 
economy (Dunne, 1990).   
 
A strand of Keynesian analysis has combined an effective demand macro perspective 
with a form of institutional analysis to provide a more complex understanding of the 
processes at work and the role of military power and conflict
1. The institutionalist 
perspective is predicated on existence of MIC (Eisenhower), where internal pressures 
for increases in military spending and forces are independent of threat. They create 
inefficiencies in the economy and so can have negative economic effects, particularly 
as the nature of defence production changed during the cold war and became very 
different from civil). This can also have other externality effects through influences 
on the civil sector and crowding out (Dunne and Skons, 2011). This approach clearly 
argues for the damaging effects of military spending on the economy.
2 
 
A related perspective was developed from Marxist theory, with the most lasting 
contribution being by Rosa Luxemburg who introduced a theory of 
underconsumption, where military expenditure provides a way to invest the surplus 
without increasing production capacities. This theory was later taken up by Baran and 
Sweezy (1966) in a manner that emphasised the monopoly nature of the post war 
system. This approach saw military spending as important in preventing realisation 
crises, through absorption of surplus without raising wages or capital. Other 
government expenditure could not do this
3. Baran and Sweezy were more circumspect 
than later proponents of the effective demand/underconsumption Pivetti (1992) and 
Cypher (1987), who suggest that military spending conscious instrument of economic 
policy and military spending has a stimulating effect on economy
4.  
 
Thus when one looks into the way military spending is dealt with by Keynesians, 
there is no simple narrative, no clear military Keynesian theoretical perspective. The 
simple belief in the value of military spending in providing the best stimulus for 




                                                 
 
2 The military sector create inefficiencies in the economy, particularly as the nature of defence 
production changed during the cold war and became very different from civil. This can also have other 
externality effects through influences on the civil sector and crowding out (Melman, 1970; Dunne, 
1995). Melman (1974) underlines the harmful effects of militarism on the American economy such as 
the loss of competitiveness, the development of the bureaucracy, the fall in productive investment and 
limited spillover effects from the military to the civil sector. Similarly, Dumas (1986) presents the 
military production as an economically non-contributory activity, which channels valuable productive 
resources and their outputs.  
3 Using the ‘surplus’ approach to Marxist analysis, which identifies value with observed quantities, so 
for example profit in price terms is seen as the money representation of surplus value (Baran and 
Sweezy, 1966; Coloumb and Dunne, 2008) 
4 Smith & Dunne (1994) provide a critique of Pivetti.  
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Military Keynesianism Evaluated 
 
Historically, the effect of major wars means that military expenditures have shown 
much larger variations than any other category of government finance. In the US the 
share of National Defence Expenditures in GDP was less than two per cent of GDP 
during the inter-war period; then rose with the war, peaking at around 50% of GDP in 
1943 and 1944 and falling sharply with the end of World War II, to around seven per 
cent, before rising again to almost 15 per cent in 1953, with the Korean War.   
Subsequently the share trended downwards, jumping upwards in the late 1960s with 
the Vietnam War, peaking at 10 per cent in 1967, before continuing its downward 
trend till 1979, falling to 5.7 per cent. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
election of President Reagan and worsening relations with the Soviet Union; the share 
again rose, peaking in 1986 at 7.8 per cent. As the Cold War thawed and then ended, 
the share fell; reaching a low of 3.8 per cent in 2000. The Global War on Terror, after 
2001, increased the share to just over 5 per cent in 2008. By US post-war historical 
standards, this is still quite low (Dunne and Smith, 2011).  
 
<Insert figure 1 around here> 
 
This discussion of strategic factors affecting the US seems a reasonable explanation of 
the pattern of military burden in Figure 1, but clearly excludes any economic 
rationale. An alternative perspective tends to start from the high unemployment of the 
inter-war period, interpreted as an inability of capitalism to generate enough effective 
demand, consumption or investment, to maintain full employment. Many forecast that 
World War II would be followed by a slump similar to that following World War I. 
This did not happen; the period from the end of World War II until the crises of the 
1970s was one of low unemployment that, in retrospect, was labelled a golden age of 
capitalism (Glyn, 2006). As discussed above, some economists, such as Baran and 
Sweezy (1966), argued that military expenditure was the source of the extra effective 
demand that stopped capitalism sinking into depression; since the US and UK devoted 
a much higher share of output to the military than their previous peacetime norms. 
They suggested that military expenditure was used to offset the tendency to stagnation 
and unemployment and adjusted to stabilise the economy and thus was a blessing for 
capitalism, rather than a burden  
 
Empirically, there are a variety of problems with this argument.  It is not clear that the 
Marxist or Keynesian theories outlined above actually predicts such under-
consumption tendencies. The strategic explanations, rooted in war and the communist 
threat, seem a better explanation of military expenditures than economic justifications. 
As we have seen it is relatively straightforward to tell a strategic story to explain the 
share of military expenditure in the US and very difficult to tell an economic story. 
Although World War II, the Korean Wars and the peak of the Vietnam wars were 
periods of relatively full employment in the US, the strong downward trend in the 
share of military expenditure is not marked by any corresponding upward trend in 
unemployment. The communist threat may have been exaggerated but it was certainly 
perceived as real. While economic factors were certainly important at a micro level 
(weapons projects and base locations) they seem less so at a macro level. Military 
expenditure would be a very bad fiscal regulator because of the lags before it comes 
into effect: it takes too long to plan and implement to be an effective stabiliser (Smith 
and Dunne, 1994). Many countries with low military expenditure, in particular   5
Germany and Japan, showed lower unemployment and faster growth than the US and 
UK, though it could be argued that they benefited from the spillovers from UK and 
US military Keynesianism. There are other explanations for the golden age and why it 
came to an end in the 1970s. When the Cold War ended, the UK and US cut their 
military expenditures substantially and rather than sinking into unemployment both 
grew rapidly; benefiting from the peace dividend. The cuts in military expenditure 
reduced government deficits, which allowed lower interest rates boosting investment 
in the technology boom of the 1990s. Thus, it does seem difficult to accept a simple 




Moving beyond institutional and historical analyses of Military Keynesianism there is 
a subset of the military spending economic growth literature that focuses specifically 
upon the econometric analysis of the Keynesian arguments. We can distinguish three 
approaches.  
 
Firstly, Granger causality methods have allowed the complexity of any underlying 
theoretical arguments to be ignored, by simply considering bivariate relations between 
military spending and growth, or with some ad hoc theoretical specification. Earlier 
studies used simple bivariate OLS analysis. At their simplest these studies were 
simply testing if growth could be explained by its own lagged values just as well as it 
could by its own lagged values plus the present lagged values of military spending i.e. 
if the coefficients on the military spending terms were jointly significantly different 
from zero. If so it was considered that there was ‘Granger causality’ from military 
spending to growth. A similar test could be conducted with military spending as the 
dependent variable. Developments of this form of analysis saw attempts to to deal 
with possible long run relations within the data, through cointegration analysis, which 
itself was superceeded by the  use of the vector autoregression (VAR) framework 
model following Dunne and Vougas (1999).  
 
More formally this analysis uses the result that if a set of variables are integrated of 
order one, I(1), that is they are stationary, I(0), after being differenced once (as seems 
common for economic variables) and there exist linear combinations of them which 
are themselves, stationary then they are said to cointegrate. If there is cointegration, 
there must be Granger causality in at least one direction ie some feedback which stops 
the I(1) variables diverging.  In dealing with I(1) data, it is convenient to rewrite the 
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This is estimated using the Johansen method in Microfit 5.0, which given the lag 
length of the VAR determines the number of cointegrating vectors, provides estimates 
of this long run relation and provides estimates of the individual error correction 
equations. Tests for Granger causality can then be made
5. 
   
Applying this approach to US data for 1950-2009,  gave the following cointegrating 
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The short run error correction equations, where z is the error correction term yt + 
0.431 mt - 0.038 t were: 
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so both the adjustment coefficients have the expected sign and are significant; both 
the lagged changes in GDP and military expenditure have significant effects on 
military expenditure, but neither of the lagged changes have significant effects on 
GDP. As Dunne and Smith (2010) argue, while it is common just to report the results 
of this test, knowing that there is Granger causality is of little interest in itself without 
knowing the sign. While there is a long run negative relation, measuring the sign of 
the effect is not straightforward in this framework
7. So while valuable, these 
techniques are difficult to use and have clear limitations.  
 
Indeed, to determine how Granger causality relates to economic causality requires an 
identified structural model, and different, observationally equivalent, just identifying 
assumptions may give very different causal pictures. This suggests it would be better 
to focus on the development and estimation of structural models rather than less 
theoretical statistical approaches (Dunne and Smith, 2010). The next two approaches 
do just that, but differ in the manner in which they specify the ‘Keynesian’ theoretical 
arguments.  
 
The second approach, considers underlying structural models based on the Keynesian 
IS-LM and combinations of Keynesian and neoclassical theory. Recent examples of 
                                                 
5 Recent examples of analyses using these techniques are are Karagianni and Pempetzoglu (2009), 
Ozsoy (2008), Kollias et al (2007).  
6 both the Johansen trace and eigenvalue tests at the 5% level suggest one cointegrating relation 
7 For instance,  t m  may be GC for  t y , with coefficients on the first and second lags of m significantly 
different from zero, but of opposite sign and roughly equal size, implying a short-run effect but no 
long-run effect.  
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these include the Keynesian model in Atesoglu (2002) Pieroni et al. (2008),  Smith 
and Tuttle 2008 and Atesoglu (2009). The models are relatively well known and so 
will not be outlined here, but they do provide a commonly used reduced form 
specification that includes the logs of real GDP military spending, non military 
spending as well as the real interest rate, the LR tests suggested a second order VAR. 
Using unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends the LR tests and model selection 
criteria actually suggested three cointegrating vectors for the log form, but we chose 
one as we expect this from the underlying theoretical model.  
 
 
   yt  =  0.173 mt + 0.418 ct - 0.002 rt + 0.018 t 
  (0.06)        (0.24)      (0.01)     (0.01) 
 
With short run growth equation: 
 
∆yt = 0.449 + 0.993 ∆yt-1 + 0.059 ∆mt-1 + 0.053 ∆ct-1 + 0.010 ∆rt-1 - 0.012 zt-1 
  (3.7)  (0.8)          (3.4)      (1.7)            (3.0)           (3.5) 
 
R-Squared =  0.48  
 S.E. of Regression = 0 .035    
 
 
With all variables in logs and r the real rate of interest and c non military spending. 
These results are relatively consistent with those of the papers cited with a positive 
effect of military spending in the long run, a similar magnitude to Pieroni et al (2008) 
but much smaller than Atesoglu (2002).   
 
There is an issue in interpreting this model as an increase in military spending does 
not necessarily imply an increase in military burden. Military burden, the share of 
military spending in GDP is probably the variable that best represents the Keynesian 
argument as it implies that more resources are allocated to the military sector, while 
increases in military spending even in constant terms may simply reflect an increase 
growth in the economy that allows more money to be spent on the military. This 
implies possible problems of causality and identification, as observing an increase in 
military spending could results from an increase in output, rather than a government 
using military spending to boost output, it may be a demand rather than a growth 
equation that is being estimated. This problem may well explain there being more 
than one cointegrating vector suggested for the model. 
 
 
 A third approach estimates Keynesian models that might be considered closer in 
spirit to the effective demand type arguments, including the aggregate production 
function eg Dunne and Nikolaidou (2005). In this specification output is a function of 
military burden, as well as taking non-military spending and investment as shares of 
GDP. Given log(Mt/Yt) = (log (Mt) – log(Yt) = (mt –yt ) and that the other shares can be 
written in this way, we can write the model as below giving long run estimates: 
 
yt   =   -0.125(mt –yt ) + 0.271(ct -yt ) + 0.048(it -yt ) -  0.029 ut + 0.030t 
(0.05)     (0.05)    (0.09)     (0.03)        (0.001) 
   8
 
With short run growth equation results: 
 
∆yt   =  1.106 - 0.049 ∆yt-1  - 0.068 ∆(mt-1 –yt-1 ) - 0.018 ∆(ct-1 -yt-1 )  + 0.153 ∆(it-1 -yt-1 ) 
  (6.1)    (0.3)            (2.3)          (0.6)                  (2.7)  
        
    - 0.091 ut-1 - 0.099 zt-1 
  (5.2)            (5.9) 
 
R-Squared =  0.55 
S.E. of Regression= 0 .017   
 
Which give the negative effect of military burden on output consistently found by 
these studies. Clearly, the implications of an increase in military burden are that 
military spending increases more than output, meaning that the military sector 
becomes relatively more important. This would seem to have a closer affinity with a 
Keynesian effective demand type argument as it would always reflect a change in 





With the recent recession and there has been a recent resurgence of military 
Keynesian attitudes from those who seem oblivious of the literature that already exists 
on the subject. Aside from the simple Keynesian perspective a number more complex 
theoretical perspectives emerged, from Keynesian and Marxist schools of thought, 
with no clear theoretical consensus of the impact of militarism and military spending 
on growth, but considerable debate using a range of empirical analyses.  This paper 
has reviewed the theoretical perspectives and the empirical analyses, using US data 
1929-2009. It is clear that there is in fact no clear Keynesian militarist theory, beyond 
a simple treatment of military spending as one component of government spending 
and that this is contested by Keynesian economists. 
 
Considering the pattern of military spending in the US economy, a strategic narrative 
seems rather more compelling than an economic one, suggesting military spending 
responded to strategic changes rather than played an important economic role and 
casting some doubt on the military Keynesian premise. Reviewing the econometric 
methods and models that have been used with a Keynesian framework also brought 
out some differences.  
 
Granger causality tests have been an important tool in the empirical analysis of the 
economic effects of military spending, but following Dunne and Smith (2011) there 
use has come under scrutiny. Test results are seen to be sensitive to the number of 
variables in the VAR, lag lengths, treatment of deterministic elements, the sample or 
observation window used, the treatment of integration and cointegration and the 
significance level used and statistical measures may not be informative about these 
choices. Since the parameters are not structural they may not be stable over different 
time periods or different countries, as was the case with the empirical results here.  It 
is important to recognise that Granger causality tests are uninformative about the 
direction of the predicted effects and Granger causality measures incremental   9
predictability not economic causality.  To determine how Granger causality relates to 
economic causality requires an identified structural model, and different, 
observationally equivalent, just identifying assumptions may give very different 
causal pictures. Moving to consider the structural Keynesian models that have been 
used to motivate cointegrating VAR analyses the paper identifies two types. The first, 
uses the level of military spending in the VAR, the second the military burden. The 
two approaches give different results and it is argued that they reflect the two rather 
different theoretical perspectives within the Keynesian framework.  
 
Overall, this paper provides some interesting empirical results that continue to bring 
into question the simple Military Keynesian arguments that suggest military spending 
should be used to stimulate the economy. It suggests the more complex theoretical 
perspectives do have value, particularly Marxist perspective where the contradictory 
role is recognised and shows the importance of developing  more structural models 
rather than using less theoretical statistical approaches. The main obstacle to 
developing more structural models is providing measures of the political and strategic 
determinants of military expenditures, such as the threat (Dunne et al, 2009).    10
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